Alright, so now let's talk about a different kind of game, the repeated game. So, a repeated game is more realistic, right? When we were talking up to now, we were talking about one-time games, right, where you got to play one time and that was your best shot. You give it your best shot that one time and do what you can, right? But a repeated game, it's going to be a situation where we play the same game over and over again, right? This makes more sense in real life. Jack and Jill's output decisions, they're not just going to produce water one time for their town and that's it. They'll probably have to keep making these decisions week after week, month after month, right? They're going to have to keep making these decisions and this interdependence between them makes a bigger deal when we have to keep making these decisions over and over, right? So when we have to make this decision over and over, it's going to cause them to want to collude even more, right? So, what we're going to see is that this repeated game, right, it's that one-time game that we're playing over and over again. So, our strategies are going to be different because we're not just playing one time.
Okay, so we've got a couple strategies here. The first one is called tit for tat. Okay, a tit for tat strategy, I put it in kind of common terms here. That's the idea of I'm going to do whatever you did last time, okay? I cooperate this period, alright? So the first period, you're going to cooperate and then if you didn't cooperate, next period I'm going to cheat, right? So I'm always going to do what you did last period. If you cheated last period, this period I will cheat. If you cooperated last period, this period I will cooperate, right? So you're just retaliating based on what they did last period. The other strategy is the trigger strategy. So the trigger strategy is someone who's going to cooperate forever until you cheat once. If you cheat once, that's it, they're done with you, they're going to cheat forever going on, right? They're triggered and they're just going to keep cheating from that point on, alright? So you can imagine when we have our Jack and Jill decision, their decisions in the long run, right? When they're having to make this decision week after week, they're going to probably try and aim for a collaborative agreement, right? Somewhere where they can both be earning 1800 instead of the 1600 they would earn when they both cheat, right? So let's go ahead and try some practice problems with these new strategies that we learned.